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Kanellis et al. (2006) defined digital forensics as “the science of collecting evidence often 
used in a court of law to prosecute those who engage in digital activities that are deemed 
unlawful.” Reliable digital forensic techniques are therefore important for prevention, 
detection, and investigation of electronic crime.
As a new field, digital forensics requires computer forensic tools that ensure reliable 
results and meet the legal requirements acceptable in the courts. In the U.S., these tools 
should meet the four Daubert criteria: (1) testable and accurate, (2) peer reviewed, (3) 
accepted by the scientific community and (4) having acceptable error rates, which also 
requires intensive testing efforts (NIST 2001, 2005a, b).
According to Nelson et  al. (2016) there are two types of computer forensic tools: 
hardware and software tools. Software forensic tools require versatility, flexibility and 
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robustness. Many are closed-source, where only the vendor has access to the code, 
thereby making it more difficult to apply the Daubert criteria. This makes it imperative 
for researchers and practitioners to put more effort into assessing this type of tool (Abu 
Talib and Baggili 2016).
One of the main issues in developing computer forensic tools is the reliability of the 
tool components once combined. According to IEEE (1991), software reliability is “the 
probability of failure-free software operation for a specified period of time in a specified 
environment”. According to Ormandjieva et  al. (2008), software failures are “primarily 
due to design faults. Repairs are made by modifying the design to make it robust against 
conditions that can trigger a failure. Software reliability has no wear-out phenomena or 
software errors occur without warning, and “old” code can exhibit a failure rate which 
increases as a function of errors introduced during upgrading. Moreover, external envi-
ronmental conditions do not affect software reliability, while internal environmental 
conditions, such as insufficient memory or inappropriate clock speeds, do affect it.”
In this paper we improve the software reliability prediction model by extending the 
COSMIC-FFP method to component-based tools (ISO 14143-1 1988; ISO/IEC 19761 
2003; Abran et al. 2009; Abu Talib 2007; Abu Talib et al. 2012). We model each compo-
nent of the tool as a discrete time Markov chain and represent it as a finite state machine. 
The goals of the proposed method are: (1) determine the tool’s reliability in the first 
stages of implementation, (2) enhance the software reliability assessment mechanism for 
extensive computer forensic tools, and (3) examine substitute tool designs. The paper 
is organized as follows. “Work related to software reliability” section presents a brief 
survey of related accomplishments in software reliability models based on the theory of 
Markov chains, and discusses the major components of COSMIC-FFP together with a 
brief literature review of digital forensic tools assessment. “Proposed software reliability 
prediction methodology” section explains the methodology for predicting reliability in 
component-based tools; a case study in “Case study: Forensic Toolkit Imager” section 
illustrates the methodology. Finally, “Conclusion and future work” section summarizes 
the research results and identifies future research avenues.
Work related to software reliability
Markov model
Markov Processes have many applications in management and the environmental sci-
ences. A prime illustration is the weather model (Wikipedia Encyclopedia), a powerful 
mathematical tool used by experts and engineers to investigate and anticipate the behav-
ior of a complex component based system (Strook 2005; Trvedi 1975). In the last three 
decades several models using Markov chains have appeared in the literature. Nonethe-
less, existing models have the consistent issue of presenting the transition probability 
but no technique for deciding it (Lai-shun et al. 2011).
A Markov model analysis can produce a number of significant calculations that 
describe system performance such as system reliability, availability, mean time to fail-
ure (MTTF), or probability of being in a specific state at a specific time. Implement-
ing a Markov model to predict software reliability has significant value for the following 
reasons:
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  • Environmental regulations fail to comply with component-based systems laws
  • Within a given state, a component may randomly process a transition available in 
that state to move to another state.
Other research efforts in this direction include: (1) building a Markov chain-based soft-
ware reliability usage model with UML (Lai-shun et al. 2011), (2) unifying the Markov 
model-based software reliability evaluation using failure data (Okamura and Dohi 2011), 
(3) using a Markov reliability model based on error classification (Jin et al. 2012), and 
(4) presenting software reliability test case design based on a Markov chain usage model 
(Wang et al. 2013).
COSMIC‑FFP measurement method
The Common Software Measurement International Consortium (COSMIC) developed 
the functional size measurement method (COSMIC-FFP), which was approved as inter-
national standard ISO 19761 (2003). Its design complies with all ISO provisions (ISO 
14143-1) (ISO 14143-1 1998) related to functional size measurement systems. It was 
developed to cope with some key deficiencies associated with previous programs such 
as FPA, designed 30 years earlier when software systems had limited and basic specifica-
tions. COSMIC-FFP emphasizes the “user view” of functional requirements, and applies 
throughout the process life cycle, from the requirements stage through to completion 
and maintenance. Whenever the COSMIC-FFP method is used to measure software 
functional size the software functional processes and their triggering events must be 
determined. Data movement is the measurement unit, a base functional component that 
shifts one or more data attributes within the same data group. The four common data 
movement types are: Entry, Exit, Read and Write.
Assessing and evaluating digital forensics tools
Without a clear strategy for empowering digital forensics research endeavors that 
expand upon each other, forensics research will fail to meet market expectations, digital 
forensic tools will become progressively out of date, and legal authorities, military and 
other clients of PC crime scene investigations will be not able depend on the results of 
digital forensic examinations (Garfinkel 2010). According to Flandrin et al. (2012) “Little 
research has been carried out on digital forensic tools evaluation and validation, which 
leaves investigators with few resources to assess their tools”.
Tool testing is important from an Information Technology (IT) perspective to ensure 
that software and hardware operate as expected. Tool testing programs have been initi-
ated by various organizations. IEEE established standards for tool testing in 1993, while 
the International Organization for Standardization and the Electrotechnical Commis-
sion (ISO/IEC) established the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing 
and Calibration Laboratories (ISO/IEC 17025) in 1999 (General Testing Methodology 
2007).
There is a high demand to evaluate computer forensic tools (Meyers and Rogers 2004). 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “there are 
three digital forensics projects currently providing resources for the digital investiga-
tor underway. These projects are supported by the U.S. Department of Justice’s National 
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Institute of Justice (NIJ), federal, state, and local law enforcement, and the NIST Office 
of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) to promote efficient and effective use of com-
puter technology in the investigation of crimes involving computers.” Computer Foren-
sic Tool Testing (CFTT) is one of these projects. NIST (Nelson et  al. 2016; Lyle et  al. 
2008) performs the following steps in testing a tool:
1. Acquires the tool to be tested.
2. Reviews the tool documentation.
3. Selects relevant test cases depending on features supported by the tool.
4. Develops a test strategy.
5. Executes test cases.
6. Produces a test report.
7. Steering Committee reviews the test report.
8. Tool vendor reviews the test report.
9. NIJ posts the test report to the Web.
Moreover, there are ongoing assessment and evaluation efforts and research in this 
direction such as (1) NIST testing efforts (NIST 2005a, b; Nelson et al. 2016), (2) the first 
common evaluation scheme for forensic software, which is planned to be extensible and 
to bolster the benchmarking of forensics applications (Hildebrandt et al. 2011), (3) the 
validation and verification of computer forensics software tools (Guo et  al. 2009) and 
(4) a high-level design for a second generation computer forensic analysis system based 
on metrics for measuring the efficacy and performance of computer forensic tools. The 
metrics include absolute and relative speed, reliability, accuracy, completeness, audit-
ability and repeatability (Ayers 2009).
Our research work introduces new reliability analysis to assist designers in choosing the 
most reliable topology for the constituents, in order to expand the accuracy of the tool and 
comply with the desired reliability level required by the ultimate user. According to Ayers 
(Guo et al. 2009), “The tool must be designed and coded to provide a high level of assur-
ance that analysis results will be correct and software operation free from error under all 
circumstances. Accuracy and reliability metrics must be 100 % in all validation tests.”
Proposed software reliability prediction methodology
A state-machine diagram is a UML 2.0 behavioral diagram (Rumbaugh et  al. 2005; 
Gongzheng and Guangquan 2010; Booch et al. 1998) designed to illustrate the dynamic 
behavior of individual devices and describe the progress of the different states and the 
transitions involved. In Fig.  1, the state machine models the behavior of the Evidence 
Item in a Forensic Toolkit Imager case study, which has four states: one initial state, 
“idle”, “toAdd”, “Adding”, and “Updating”. When the “Add evidence item” option is clicked, 
it triggers the “Evidence Item” state to shift from the “idle” to the “toAdd” state.
The purpose of a Markov model is to evaluate the accuracy of state machine programs 
(Ormandjieva 2002). Figure 2 illustrates the mapping of the Evidence Item object to a 
Markov model. Since there is only one event for each state, each event has a probability 
of 1, P12 represents the probability that the event will be triggered with the subsequent 
transition from state E1 to state E2.
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Table 1 shows the transition matrix P for the Evidence Item Object that results from 
the state machine diagram where the ijth entry is pij and the entries in each row add up 
to 1. The prediction of reliability is derived from the steady state of the Markov model. 
The steady vector [wxyz] of the Evidence Item object is calculated based on the P matrix 
below:
The steady vector value obtained is: [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25].
COSMIC-FFP and UML 2.0 state machine diagrams share the same concept as seen 
from a mapping of such concepts documented in Ormandjieva et al. (2008). Applying 
the COSMIC-FFP measurement method makes it possible for us to predict software 
reliability in the first stages of tool development. Our methodology for software reliabil-
ity prediction for forensics tools is summarized as follows (Ormandjieva et al. 2008; Abu 









→ w = 0.25, x = 0.25, y = 0.25, z = 0.25.
Fig. 1 Evidence Item state machine diagram
Fig. 2 Evidence Item state diagram illustrating transition probabilities pij
Table 1 Transition matrix P for Evidence Item object
E1 E2 E3 E4
E1 0 1 0 0
E2 0 0 1 0
E3 0 0 0 1
E4 1 0 0 0
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1. State machine diagrams can result from the multiple interrelated sequence diagrams 
drawn using the COSMIC-FFP measurement method. This is shown in “Sequence 
diagrams from COSMIC-FFP” and “State machine diagrams from COSMIC-FFP” 
sections.
2. The probabilities of state transitions of an object due to events (environmental or 
related to that same object) are measured as displayed in “Markov model applica-
tions” section.
3. The product machine of the state machine objects pertaining to the same compo-
nent results in an extended state machine outlining the behavior of the component. 
“Markov model applications” section illustrates this process.
4. The Markov model of a component is implemented in two stages. As an initial step, 
the Markov models are built for its objects. For the second stage, the Markov model 
for the entire component is built. This latter consists of synchronously interacting 
objects. “Markov model applications” section illustrates this process.
Case study: Forensic Toolkit Imager
FTK Imager is a data preview and imaging tool that allows forensic investigators to 
assess electronic evidence. A Forensic Toolkit (FTK) helps to obtain, store, analyze, and 
provide computer evidence. To preserve the integrity of case evidence, forensic investi-
gators do not work on the original files. Instead, they create an exact replica of the files 
and work on the image to ensure that the original files remain intact.
Sequence diagrams from COSMIC‑FFP
A sequence diagram is a UML2.0 behavioral diagram (Rumbaugh et al. 2005; Gongzheng 
and Guangquan 2010; Booch et al. 1998), generally adopted for analysis and design that 
models the flow of logic within the system in a visual manner, enabling both documenta-
tion and validation of the user’s logic. In the RUP context (ISO/IEC 19761 2003; Abran 
et al. 2009), the functional processes used in COSMIC-FFP can explain the series of sce-
narios for the software. In the Forensic Toolkit Imager case study, for example, the first 
sequence diagram (Fig. 3, part 1) demonstrates that, when Add Evidence Item is clicked, 
the FTK Imager receives a message. The FTK Imager then instructs the Image to be cre-
ated, and the Image is created. This process of adding Evidence Item and creating an 
image is referred to as a functional process, and is activated by clicking Add Evidence 
Item. Similarly, Fig. 3, part 2 is a scenario illustrating a sequence of events between the 
Evidence Item, FTK Imager and the Image. This scenario also incorporates a sequence of 
events within the tool (FTK Image in this case) to generate a hash image. Therefore, each 
functional process involves both its sub processes and its triggering events, which are 
sequences of events (or data movements).
State machine diagrams from COSMIC‑FFP
According to the COSMIC-FFP definitions given in ISO/IEC 19761 (2003) and Abran 
et al. (2009) and the sequence diagrams that derive from it, state machine diagrams can 
be obtained by applying these sequence diagrams. COSMIC-FFP measurements can be 
mapped to UML 2.0 state diagrams applying the technique proposed in Vasilache and 
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Tanaka (2004), applied in Ormandjieva et  al. (2008) (Abu Talib 2007; Abu Talib et  al. 
2012) and demonstrated by state machine diagrams from multiple interrelated scenarios 
(or sequence diagrams).
The steps are summarized as follows (Ormandjieva et al. 2008; Abu Talib 2007; Abu 
Talib et al. 2012; Vasilache and Tanaka 2004):
Step 1  Draw sequence diagrams for all scenarios as illustrated in the previous 
section
Step 2  Draw a dependency diagram that shows the link between the series of sce-
narios (sequence diagrams) based on time dependencies between scenarios 
and dependencies related to their cause-effect and their generalization. In 
this case study we can say “Generate Hash” scenario depends on the “Add 
Evidence Item” scenario
Step 3  Create the state machines diagrams following the previous two steps. The 
sequence diagram in Fig.  3, part 1 has the following set of tuples =  {(Evi-
dence_Item, FTK_Imager, add_Evidence_Item), (Evidence_Item, Evidence_
Item, add), (FTK_Imager, Image, click_Create_Image), (Image, Image, cre-
ate)} while the sequence diagram in Fig.  3, part 2 has the following set of 
tuples  =  {(Evidence_Item, Evidence_Item, update), (Evidence Item, FTK_
Imager, finish), (FTK_Imager, Image, generate hash), (Image, Image, store)}. 
Since three objects are involved in each scenario, three state machine dia-
grams can be derived as shown Fig. 4
Step 4  Adjust the final state machines and approve the compatibility between 
scenarios and state machines to ensure that the behavior of the final state 
machine diagrams reproduce the information contained in the scenarios 
(Figs. 5, 6)
Fig. 3 “Add Evidence Item” (part 1) & “Generate Hash” (part 2) sequence diagrams
Fig. 4 Initial state machine diagrams from Fig. 3
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Markov model applications
The work reported here builds on our research results using the COSMIC-FFP method 
for testing purposes, by combining the functions measured by the COSMIC-FFP meas-
urement procedure with a black box testing strategy (Abu Talib et al. 2005, 2006; Abran 
et al. 2004). This extends the COSMIC-FFP and reliability prediction model to the com-
ponent-based tool context.
We can assume that each component in the tool is replaceable and functionally inde-
pendent from the rest of the tool components. In order to predict the reliability of such a 
component, FTK Imager and Image objects are mapped to their corresponding Markov 
models as shown previously with the Evidence Item object. For example, the mapping of 
FTK Imager object to a Markov model assigns a probability of 1 for two events since only 
one event issues from F1 and F4 states, a probability of 1/2 for each of the two external 
events generating transitions from state F2, and 1/3 for each of the external three events 
issuing from F3. Table 2 illustrates the probability matrix for the map of the Image object 
to a Markov model, which is identical to the Evidence Item object mapping.
To ascertain the reliability of the component composed of Evidence Item, FTK Imager 
and Image objects, and calculate its level of uncertainty in the Markov model H, we 
applied the following formulas:








Fig. 5 FTK Imager state machine diagram
Fig. 6 Image state machine diagram
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where H stands for the level of uncertainty in a Markov chain corresponding to the whole 
component; Hi represents the level of uncertainty in a Markov chain corresponding to an 
object, v is a steady state distribution vector for the corresponding Markov chain, and pij 
are the transition probabilities in the extended state machines modeling the behaviors of 
the ith object (Ormandjieva et al. 2008; Abu Talib 2007; Abu Talib et al. 2012).
The synchronous product of Evidence Item, FTK Imager and Image and its corre-
sponding transition matrix P built to calculate H, are shown in Fig. 7 and Table 3.
Table  4 shows the next steps in calculating H for each object within the above 
component.
We applied the same steps for other components in the same tool and compared the 
results. Major values of reliability measure indicate less uncertainty associated with the 
model, hence a higher level of software reliability. Adopting one evidence item implies 
Table 2 Transition matrix P for FTK Imager and Image objects
F1 F2 F3 F4 I1 I2 I3 I4
F1 0 1 0 0 I1 0 1 0 0
F2 0
1/2 1/2 0 I2 0 0 1 0
F3 0 0
2/3 1/3 I3 0 0 0 1
F4 1 0 0 0 I4 1 0 0 0
Fig. 7 The synchronous product of Evidence Item, FTK Imager and Image objects as one component
Table 3 Transition matrix P of the component
E1F1I1 E2F2I1 E2F3I2 E2F3I3 E3F3I3 E4F3I3 E1F4I3 E1F1I4
E1F1I1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
E2F2I1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
E2F3I2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
E2F3I3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
E3F3I3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
E4F3I3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
E1F4I3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
E1F1I4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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less uncertainty in a Markov model for the FTK imager object and accordingly its behav-
ior is not so complex that it necessitates generating additional sequences to describe it, 
while this is not the case for one FTK imager controlling two evidence items.
Conclusion and future work
The advantage of the method reported in this paper derives from the ability to consider 
the measures of functionality early on where sequence diagrams are derived, as with 
COSMIC-FFP this makes it possible to take into account the uncertainty in the opera-
tional profile of forensic tools (i.e., the uncertainty of environmental events) as well as 
the uncertainty of failure of component behavior in forensic tools, based on:
  • A component being recognized as a physical and substitutable part of the system 
which realizes, and conforms to, a set of interfaces (Jin et  al. 2012); a component 
that is functionally detached from the rest of the components in a component-based 
system.
  • Knowledge of the software architecture requirements (corresponds to reliability 
structures in reliability theory, see “Case study: Forensic Toolkit Imager” section).
  • Evaluation of component reliability, in the context where a component is a group of 
interacting software objects the behaviors of which are modeled with state diagrams, 
and followed by application of the Markov model (see “Case study: Forensic Toolkit 
Imager” section). The probabilities of state transitions of an object generated by 





0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
 
0 1 0 0
0 1/2 1/2 0
0 0 2/3 1/3
1 0 0 0
v [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25] [0.182, 0.364, 0.273, 0.182]
Hi HEvidence_Item = HImage =
-(( 0.25 * ( 0log(0) + 1log1
+ 0log(0) + 0log(0)) + ( 0.25
* ( 0log(0) + 0log(0) +
1log1 + 0log(0)) + ( 0.25 * (
0log(0) + 0log(0) + 0log(0)
+ 1log1) + ( 0.25 * ( 1log1 +
0log(0) + 0log(0) +
0log(0))) = 0
HFTK_Imager = - ((0.182 * (0log(0)
+ 1log1 + 0log(0) + 0log(0)) +
(0.364*(0log(0) + ½ log½ +
½log½ + 0log(0)) +
0.273*(0log(0)+0log(0)+1/3log
1/3+2/3log2/3) + (0.182 * (1log1
+ 0log(0) + 0log(0) + 0log(0)))
= 0.615 
Reliability Component = (HEvidence_Item + HFTK_Imager+ HImage)
– HEvidence_Item-FTK_Imager-Image = (0 + 0.615+ 0) – 0 = 0.615
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events (environmental or internal to the object) are measured as illustrated in “Case 
study: Forensic Toolkit Imager” section, where the environmental events are random 
and not regulated by system laws.
In the work reported here, the number of case studies was limited. Further work will 
explore how to approach such considerations as scalability and the processing of huge 
data. In addition, further specific templates are required for generating the set of sce-
narios and converting them into state diagrams.
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